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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAHf

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

:

v.

:

PAUL A. BRANCH,

:

Case No. 20557

:

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by
the Supreme Court on September 17f 1987. Originally, this case was
an appeal from convictions and judgments imposed for Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony with firearms enhancement; Aggravated
Assault, a third degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony and
Being a Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While the facts set forth in the opinion summarize the
weakness in the identification evidence in this case, several
additional facts are of note. When officers searched the Pink Motel
in Los Angeles, they located a suitcase with tags bearing a female's
first name and a surname of Miera.

Inside that suitcase officers

found items belonging to Joey Miera, the defendant's half brother
who closely resembles defendant, and a picture of Mr. Miera (Trial
Day 6, p. 85-89, 90, 96-98).

The proprietor of the pawn shop in
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I
southern California where some of the jewelry taken from the Oakwood
robbery was pawned, selected Joey Miera's picture from a photo

i
spread (Trial Day 8, p. 43-49). The pawn shop proprietor was unable
to identify the defendant at trial as the person who pawned the
items (Trial Day 8, p. 36).

i
INTRODUCTION
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of the Supreme Court,

in Brown v. Pickard, denying

I

rehfg, 11 P.512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions. . . .

I

11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this
Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions for
rehearings in proper cases. When this court,
however, has considered and decided all of the
material questions involved in a case, a
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that
we have based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, or have either misapplied or
overlooked something which materially affects
the result. . . . If there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a petition for rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
Cummings v. Nielson, supra at 624. The argument section of this
brief will establish that, applying these standards, this petition

i

4

^

^
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d

for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted.
In its opinion in State v. Branch, Case No. 20557, (filed September
17, 1987) (attached as Addendum A) this Court erred in its decision
regarding the giving of a cautionary eyewitness identification
instruction, based its decision on an incorrect principle of law and
otherwise misapplied or overlooked something which would materially
affect the result in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTION REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
This case was on direct appeal to this Court when the
Court rendered its opinion in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah
1986).

Appellant had submitted his opening brief outlining the

unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony prior to
issuance of the Long opinion and, by the luck of the draw, was not
the defendant selected for the preferential treatment awarded
defendant Long in finding that the Court's failiure to give a
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification was reversible
error.
Although this Court has made clear that the standard of
review for cases tried prior to the decision in State v. Long,
supra, continues to be whether the judge abused his discretion in
failing to give a cautionary eyewitness identification rather than
the heightened standard set forth in Long (See State v. Long, supra,
State v. Quevedo, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1987)), Appellant
Branch respectfully requests that this Court reconsider

- 3 -
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the position on the prospective application of Long, especially in
the context of the present case.
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
107 S.Ct.

, 93 L.Ed.2d 649,

j

(1987), the United States Supreme Court held that

the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106

S.Ct. 1712 (1986) that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges

|

to exclude blacks from a jury may violate equal protection should be
applied retroactively.

In Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, the Court

noted that:

I

"failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending
on direct review violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication"

I
Griffith v. Kentucky, 93 L.Ed.2d at 658.
The Griffith court acknowledged that "after we have decided a new
rule in a case selected, the integrity of the judicial review
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on

I

direct review . . . (and that) it is the nature of judicial review
that precludes us from 'simply fishing one case from the stream of
i
appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar
cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule1".
i
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) Id. at 658.
The Griffith Court also noted that "selective application
of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated
i
defendants the same" and that "the problem with not applying new
rules to cases pending on direct review is 'the actual inequity that
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results when the court chooses which of many similarly situated
defendants should be the chance beneficiary' of a new rule"
(citations omitted).

Id. at 658-659.

The Griffith court went on to examine the "clear break"
exception whereby courts had applied prospectively only rules of
criminal procedure deemed to be a "clear break" with precedent. The
Court disapproved such a "clear break" exception and held "that a
new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
review . . . with no exception for cases in which the new rule
constitutes a "clear break" with the past".

16^. at 661.

In addition, the opportunity to consolidate appeals
exists where similar issues are presented to the Court.

Had Mr.

Branch's appeal been consolidated with that of defendant Long, Mr.
Branch's case would have been reversed under the rationale set forth
in Long.

Because Mr. Branch was unaware that the Long appeal

presented a similar issue and would be singled out and because Mr.
Branch pursued additional issues, the cases were not consolidated
and the Branch case did not receive the heightened protections set
forth in Long.
In State v. Long, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that the failure to give a cautionary eyewitness
identification instruction could deny the defendnat due process of
law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution,

in the

present case, the failure to give such an instruction violated Mr.
Branch's right to due process of law under the Utah Constitution and
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failure to apply Long retroactively where such a constitutional
violation occurred violates Mr. Branch's rights to due process and
equal protection of the law under the United States and Utah
Constitutions.

(See Griffith v. Kentuckyy supra).

I

Mr. Branch

respectfully requests that this Court grant this Petition for
Rehearing and allow both parties the opportunity to brief the issues

i

as to whether his due process rights under the Utah Constitution
were violated by the failure to give an eyewitness identification
instruction in this case and whether his rights to due process and

i

equal protection under both Constitutions were violated by this
Court's failure to apply the decision in State v. Long, supra, to
his case where his case was on direct appeal at the time the Long

i

decision was issued.
In the event this Court refuses to review its decision to
apply the holding regarding cautionary eyewitness identification

^

instructions in State v. Long, supra, prospectively and not to cases
on direct appeal at the time of the decision, Mr. Branch
nevertheless requests that this Court review its decision that the

*

trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give the
requested instruction.
As this Court noted in the opinion in this case, "there

*

exists a substantial possibility that defendant has been confused in
this case with his half brother, who closely resembles him."

(See

Addendum A at 5 ) . In addition to the facts outlined in this opinion
which support such a possibility, the pawnshop owner in California
where many of the items involved in this robbery were located,
selected Mr. Branch's half brother from a photo spread (Trial Day 8,
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*

243-49).

The pawnshop owner did not identify Mr. Branch in court

(Trial Day 8, p. 36). A suitcase found by officers at the Pink
Motel in Los Angeles where the other suspects were arrested bore
tags with the surname of "Miera" and contained personal effects and
a picture of Mr. Branch's half brother, Joey Miera (Trial Day 6, p.
85-89, 90, 96-98).

This information coupled with that outlined in

the opinion and Appellant's Brief suggests a substantial probability
that Mr. Branch was incorrectly identified in this case. Requiring
a trial court to instruct a jury as to the fallibility of eyewitness
identification in circumstances such as this where weak, hesitant,
conflicting identifications are given and a substantial possibility
or even likelihood exists that the witnesses have confused the
defendant with his look-alike half brother is the least this Court
should do to protect rights to due process and a fair trial of an
accused.

The substantial possibility of misidentification

acknowledged by this Court should, in and of itself, give rise to a
finding that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to
give such an instruction.
In its opinion, this Court expresses concern about the
need to "be cautious in applying the pre-Long case law without
reference to the later analysis [in Long]yf at 5.

Assuming this

Court does maintain its position that Long be applied prospectively,
the concerns regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification
as outlined in Long are nevertheless applicable to cases tried
before that decision i.e. eyewitness identification was just as
subject to pitfalls before the Long decision as after.

In fact, the

brief submitted in this case prior to the decision in Long,

- 7

-
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i
extensively addressed those concerns, citing many of the authorities
cited in State v, Long.

Hence, even if this Court decides to

continue to apply the Long holding prospectively it nevertheless may

I

consider the pitfalls of eyewitness identification in determining
whether a trial judge abused his discretion in a given case. As
this Court noted in Long, "jurors are for the most part, unaware [of
the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications."

I

State v.

Long, supra at 490. This lack of awareness was just as true prior
to the Long decision and buttresses Mr. Branch's argument that an

i

eyewitness identification instruction was necessary for Mr. Branch
to receive due process and a fair trial under the circumstances of
this case.

^
State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), decided

shortly after State v. Long, supra, is the only case where this
Court has found that a trial judge abused his discretion in failing
to give an eyewitness identification instruction.

^

The facts in this

case are more closely aligned with Jonas than with cases finding no
abuse of discretion.

None of the witnesses had an adequate

*

opportunity to view the accused, witnesses changed their description
of the suspect, no physical evidence corroborated the identification
(although there was physical evidence suggesting that the look alike

'

half brother was involved) and witnesses gave hesitant and confused
identifications.

The only real difference between the facts in this

case and those in Jonas is that several rather than just one witness
gave unreliable identification testimony.
This Court focused on that difference and pointed out
that it has never found an abuse of discretion where more than one
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'

- 8

-

'

*

eyewitness was involved.

However to draw a rigid rule based on the

number of witnesses who "kind of" identified the defendant does not
directly address the question of whether in a given case the
identification evidence raised serious questions about its
reliability and therefore the trial judge abused his discretion in
failing to give the requested eyewitness identification
instruction.

A more important focus than the number of witnesses

would be whether the eyewitnesses had an adequate opportunity to
view the defendant.

Where such an adequate opportunity exists,

there is less of a chance that misidentification would occur than in
the present situation where several witnesses did not have an
adequate opportunity to view the suspect and the defendant had a
half brother who closely resembled him.
In all of the pre-Long cases addressing the failure to
give an eyewitness identification instruction, the witnesses had an
adequate opportunity to view the defendant.
684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984);
1985);

See State v. Bingham,

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986);

State v. Malmrose,

649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984);
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1984); State v. Schaffer,
638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah
1985); and State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984).

This contrasts

sharply with the present case where this Court acknowledged that
"(n)one of the witnesses had a particularly good opportunity to
observe the robbers."

State v. Branch, supra at 5.

Permitting a

conviction to stand where an eyewitness identification instruction
was requested by the defendant, the identification evidence was the

- 9 -
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"heart" of the state's case (See State v, Branch, supra at 4), the
evidence was unreliable in that it was hesitant and conflicting,
given by persons without adequate opportunity to view the suspects
and presented a "substantial possibility" that the defendant was
confused with his look alike half brother is untenable.
CONCLUSION
•

'

• • > • - • •

In light of the foregoing, Appellant respectfully
petitions this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and
give both parties the opportunity to brief the issues of whether
Appellant's due process rights under the Utah Constitution were
violated by the trial court's failure to give the cautionary
eyewitness identification instruction and whether Appellant's due
process and equal protection rights were violated by this Court's
prospective application of State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
In the alternative, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
reconsider its decision that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to give the requested instruction and find that such a
failure was an abuse of discretion, and reverse the convictions and
remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this

y?

day of Oc/tobyfer, 1987.

C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellant
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A
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

No. 20557
F I L E D
September 17, 1987

v.
Paul Anthony Branch,
Defendant and Appellant.

Geoffrey J. Butler# Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leonard K. Russon
Attorneys:

Brooke Wells, Christopher Kerecman, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

DURHAM, Justice:
/
A jury convicted defendant Paul Anthony Branch of
theft, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The judge
who supervised defendant's jury trial subsequently convicted
defendant of being a habitual criminal.
Defendant challenges the admission of testimony from
several eyewitnesses; the judge's refusal to give a cautionary
instruction concerning the eyewitness testimony; the sufficiency
of the evidence; tfye judge's application of the habitual criminal statute; the fconviction for aggravated robbery as well as
aggravated assault and theft, which defendant claims are lesser
included offenses of aggravated robbery; and the giving of a
jury instruction concerning possession of recently stolen
property.
Two men robbed the Oakwood Jewelry store in Salt Lake
City in August 1984. One of the robbers forced the store's sole
employee into the bathroom at the back of the store. A customer
interrupted the robber and was forced into the bathroom with the
employee. The pair was instructed not to look at the robbers'
faces. One robber guarded the bathroom while the other plundered the jewelry cases. A woman and her daughter who were
parked in a car outside the store saw the robbers leave the
store. A diner in a nearby restaurant also observed the
robbers leaving the store.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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/'

In September, Los Angeles police officers arrested
several people, including the co-defendants in this case, in
Los Angeles on drug-related charges. A search made at the time
of their arrest revealed jewelry from the Salt Lake robbery.
The search also uncovered a picture of defendant's half brother
and identification documents in the name of defendant's half
brother.
The Los Angeles police identified the store where some
of the jewelry had been pawned and showed the proprietor of the
establishment a photo array from which he selected a picture of
defendant's half brother as the man who had pawned the stolen
jewelry.
The Salt Lake City police received a picture of
defendant's half brother, which they misidentified as defendant.
Defendant was arrested for the robbery. At the time of his
arrest, no jewelry was found among his possessions. Defendant
was tried with the men who were arrested in Los Angeles.
The Eyewitness Identifications and Testimony
Defendant raises two issues concerning the admission
of the eyewitness testimony associating him with the crime:
the trial court's refusal to suppress in-court identifications
of defendant by the State's witnesses and the trial judge's
failure to give a cautionary jury instruction concerning
eyewitness identification. We reject defendant's arguments.
defendant made a motion in limine to suppress the
eyewitness testimony. In support of his motion, defendant
presented a summary that his counsel had created from the
police reports and uncertified copies of the preliminary
hearing transcripts. These materials purportedly demonstrated that the eyewitness testimony should have been
suppressed. Defendant apparently based the motion on Utah
Rule of Evidence 403 and an assertion that improper pretrial
identification violated defendant's federal constitutional
rights. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). We find no
error in the trial judge's rejection of defendant's motion.
The trial judge stated that he found "no real evidence
here of unnecessarily suggestive procedures that took place
during any pretrial investigation." In the absence of clear
ferror, we uphold a trial judge's factual assessment underlying
a decision to grant or deny a suppression motion. State v.
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1985); State v. Tuttle, 16
Utah 2d 288, 291, 399 P.2d 580, 582, cert, denied, 382 U.S. 872
(1965). In this case, the trial judge considered the evidence
proferred by the defense with appropriate suspicion. Although
not bound by the Rules of Evidence in a suppression hearing, a
trial judge must weigh the reliability and probative value of
No. 20557
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materials presented to aid in the decision to admit or exclude
evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 1101, 104(a). In this case, the
defense evidence consisted largely of defendant's own summaries
of police reports and unofficial transcripts of the preliminary
hearings prepared by the public defender's staff. Police reports
are not prepared for the purpose of accurately recording the descriptions of a perpetrator given by individual witnesses; rather,
they are compiled to aid the police in apprehending the perpetrator and often reflect the product of collective memory as it
is gathered by several officers who communicate with each other.
Defendant's prepared abstracts of such records are even more suspect because the witnesses' statements had been filtered through
yet another recorder, who is not likely to be unbiased. The
preliminary hearing reports are similarly suspect because the
" preparation was done, not by a neutral reporter, but by a party.
Further, the trial judge felt that various witnesses' statements
which described defendant as Mexican, Iranian, or Italian were
not necessarily inconsistent and were not the product of improper
police procedure, leaving the issue of inconsistency for crossexamination at trial. The only evidence defendant presented
concerning the pretrial identification procedures used by the
police was statements of defendant's counsel concerning the array
displays and the pictures used in the arrays.1 Therefore, we
think the judge did not err in rejecting defendant's claim that
the procedures were unnecessarily suggestive.
The trial judge was also correct in refusing to exclude
the testimony on the basis of Utah Rule of Evidence 403:
'

Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

"We will not overturn the trial court's ruling [on the
application of Rule 403] unless the abuse of discretion is so
severe that it results in a 'likelihood of injustice.'" State
v. Knowles, 709 P.2d 311. 312 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v.
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982)). We do not think the
trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to exclude the
eyewitness identifications. Indeed, we do not see how the eyewitness testimony could fall within the categories of evidence
excludable under Rule 403. The eyewitness testimony did not
have the inflammatory potential found in the sort of evidence
typically excluded under that Rule. See State v. Cloud, 722
Tl The police officer who showed at least one witness a photo
array was cross-examined by the counsel of one of the codefendants concerning the identification of that co-defendant.

3
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P.2d 750 (Utah 1986) (gruesome photographs of a crime victim
should have been excluded because the probative value of the
photographs was outweighed by the possibility that the jury's
passions would be inflamed by the gruesome nature of the crime
and would distract them from the issue of the defendant's mental
state). Nor could the eyewitness testimony have confused or
misled the jury or wasted its time. The eyewitness testimony
was the heart of the State's case and did not serve to draw the
jury into the type of collateral assessments that Rule 403 is
designed to avoid. The trial judge was correct in allowing the
jury to assess the credibility of the eyewitness; Rule 403 is
not to be used to allow the trial judge to substitute his
assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the
jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not
find it credible.
We next consider defendant's claim that a cautionary
instruction should have been given. In State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483 (Utah 1986), we made a detailed analytical consideration of
the reliability of eyewitness testimony and concluded that "in
cases tried from this date forward, trial courts shall give such
an instruction whenever eyewitness identification-is a central
issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the
defense." Id. at 492. This case was, however, tried before
Long became law. In reviewing cases tried before Long, we
evaluate the defendant's claim under the case law applicable
at the time the defendant was tried. State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d
1378-, 1380 (Utah 1986) .
At the time of trial, the giving of a cautionary
instructicJn was left to the discretion of the trial judge under
the "totality of the circumstances." State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d
1251, 1254 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378
(Utah 1986) (summarizing the crucial pre-Long case law).
This case presents us with a particularly difficult
task in evaluating whether the trial judge abused his discretion. The eyewitness testimony identifying defendant as one of
the robbers was equivocal. The jewelry store clerk admitted
that she did not see defendant during the robbery because she
was restrained in the bathroom by a man she identified as one
of the co-defendants. A Los Angeles police officer identified
defendant as a man he saw walking in front of the motel where
the co-defendants were arrested. The officer admitted that
he was on a routine patrol when he saw defendant for a few
moments. The officer testified that he had observed defendant
only briefly and had no reason to suspect defendant of any
criminal activity. The officer admitted that defendant strongly
resembled defendant's half brother, whose picture was found in
the co-defendants' motel room, and that the officer had only
recently learned that the picture was not of defendant. The
officer admitted that the photo had been included in photo
No. 20557
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spreads on the assumption that it was of defendant. The
officer's partner, who had a similarly brief glimpse, also
identified defendant* Defendant was identified by the owner of
the jewelry store, who claimed he saw defendant walking around
in the store early on the day of the robbery. However, the
store owner identified one of defendant's co-defendants as
defendant at trial and then changed his mind and identified
defendant. The mother and the daughter who were in a parked
car in front of the jewelry store and saw the robbers briefly
as they left the store identified defendant, whom they described
as bearded. The diner in the restaurant across the street also
identified defendant. Finally, the customer who interrupted
the robbery testified. She described the man she saw in the
front of the store as unbearded. On direct examination, she
identified one of the co-defendants as the robber at the front
of the store. Under cross-examination, she changed her mind
and identified defendant.
None of the witnesses had a particularly good
opportunity to observe the robbers. The witnesses gave inconsistent and hesitant descriptions, and some witnesses changed
their opinion at trial. Furthermore, there exists a substantial
possibility that defendant has been confused in this case with
his half brother, who closely resembles him. On the other hand,
we have never found an abuse of discretion when a judge refused
a cautionary instruction in a case with more than one eyewitness, and having decided to apply Long prospectively, we must
be cautious in applying the pre-Long case law without reference
to our later analysis. Were I writing only for myself and
Justice Stewart, I would find an abuse of discretion. However,
three of .my colleagues are convinced that no abuse of discretion
occurred; therefore, defendant's argument must be rejected.
We also reject defendant's claim that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction. The jury simply chose
to believe the eyewitness identifications of defendant.
f

The Lesser Included Offense
Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery of the
store clerk and aggravated assault of the customer who interrupted the robbery and was forced into the bathroom. The jury
also found defendant guilty of theft. Defendant argues that
aggravated assault and theft are lesser included offenses of
aggravated robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1978).
toe analyze the issues separately.
charge.

We disagree with defendant as to the aggravated assault
A charge is a lesser included offense when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or
an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1978).
In this case, aggravated robbery and aggravated
assault were simply two offenses committed within the same
criminal episode. The crimes required proof by different
evidence and had two different victims. The testimony of the
store clerk established the robbery; the testimony of the
customer proved the assault.
We agree with defendant, however, that theft is a
lesser included offense of aggravated robbery in this case. In
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), we considered whether
theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. The
analysis set forth in that case is controlling.

I

The principal test [for whether a crime
is a lesser included offense] involves a comparison of the statutory elements of each
crime. Subsection 76-1-402(3)(a) provides
the definition of lesser included offenses
that is applied for this purpose: an offense
-ijS lesser included when *[i]t is established
by proof of the same or less than all the
facts required to establish the commission
of the offense charged . . . ." Thus, where
the two crimes are "such that the greater
cannot be committed without necessarily
having committed the lesser," State v.
Baker, Utah, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (1983), then
as a matter of law they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for
both. So it is with robbery and theft, which
are generally acknowledged to occupy the
greater-lesser relationship. State v.
Elliott, Utah, 641 P.2d 122, 123 (1982);
People v. Cole, 31 Cal. 3d 568, 582, 645 P.2d
1182, 1191, 183 Cal. Rptr. 350, 359 (1982).
The secondary test is required by the
circumstance that some crimes have multiple
variations, so that a greater-lesser
relationship exists between some variations
of these crimes, but not between others.
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E.g., State in Interest of L.G.W., Utah, 641
P.2d 127, 130-31 (1982) (forcible sexual
abuse and lewdness). A theoretical comparison of the statutory elements of two
crimes having multiple variations will be
insufficient. In order to determine whether
a defendant can be convicted and punished
for two different crimes committed in connection with a single criminal episode, the
court must consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship
exists between the specific variations of
the crimes actually proved at trial. The
multiple variations of the crime of aggravated robbery involved in this case show why
this is necessary.
Aggravated robbery is committed by
using a firearm in one of three circumstances: "[1] in an attempt to commit, [2]
during the commission of, or [3] in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery." § 76-6-302(1) and
(3). As the district court concluded,
according to a theoretical comparison of the
statutory elements of each crime, theft is
not a lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery because theft is not "established by
proof of the same or less than all the facts
-required to establish the commission of
[*one variation of] the offense charged."
§ 76-1-402(3)(a). This is because the
obtaining or exercising of unauthorized
control over the property of another (an
element of theft) is not an element of the
first variation of aggravated robbery (use
of a gun'in an attempt to commit a robbery).
In contrast, the greater-lesser relationship
does exist between theft and the second
variation of aggravated robbery (use cff a
gun during the commission of a robbery).
In this case, the only evidence before
the jury showed a completed robbery, with
property taken from the person of the manager
by use of a firearm, and the crime of theft
as part of that same criminal episode. As to
- this variation of aggravated robbery, the
crime of theft is a lesser included offense.
Consequently, on the facts of this case
§ 76-1-402(3) clearly bars this defendant's
being convicted and punished for theft in
addition to aggravated robbery.
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State v. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97-98 (footnote omitted).
The State attempts to distinguish Hill by arguing that
defendant was charged with second degree felony theft, which
requires that the property stolen is valued at over $1,000.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) (1978). We cannot
accept that argument. Section 76-6-412(1)(a)(i) does not
outline the elements of the crime of theft; it simply categorizes theft for sentencing purposes into various degrees
of felonies and misdemeanors.
The State also argues that defendant committed
attempted theft and thus is within the version of aggravated
robbery of which theft is not a lesser included offense. State
v. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. We cannot see how that follows from
the facts, which demonstrate a "completed robbery" as in Hill.
Jury Instruction
Defendant asserts numerous errors surrounding a jury
instruction concerning possession of recently stolen property.
The facts, however, contain no suggestion that defendant ever
had possession of recently stolen property; thus, the instruction could not, even if it was erroneous, have prejudiced him.
The issue of the propriety of the instruction is one for defendant# s co-defendants who were in possession of the stolen
jewelry when they were arrested.
/

Habitual Criminal
Defendant was convicted under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-1001 (1978) of being a habitual criminal. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978) (a defendant with two prior convictions
within certain statutorily set perimeters may "upon conviction
of at least a felony of the second degree . . ."be determined
to be a habitual priminal).
The State offered proof of three previous eligible
felony convictions. One conviction was accompanied by an
affidavit of voluntariness signed by defendant. The affidavit
was apparently executed pursuant to Utah District Court Rule of
Practice 3.6, which gives a trial judge the option of having a
defendant sign an affidavit of voluntariness. Defendant does
not assail the State's use of that affidavit. See State v.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1985) (affidavit signed by
plaintiff, with advice of counsel, raises presumptions of voluntariness and knowledge of elements and nature of charge).
Defendant argues not that his other two guilty pleas were
involuntary, but that the State has not proven that the other
two pleas were voluntary. We agree that an involuntary guilty
plea cannot be used to enhance or support a subsequent conviction. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) (plea
No. 20557

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

entered without counsel could not support a conviction under
recidivist statute). However, we agree with the trial court
that the State has proven that defendant's prior guilty pleas
were voluntary. The State demonstrated that both pleas were
entered with the benefit of counsel. Therefore, in the absence
of any evidence demonstrating the pleas were involuntary, the
pleas are presumed to have been voluntary. See Moxley v.
Morris, 655 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 1982). A defendant can overcome
this presumption by presenting to the trial court some evidence
of involuntariness, thus shifting back to the State the burden
of demonstrating voluntariness. The defendant is the party who
can most readily demonstrate that the pleas were involuntarily
made if they indeed were; it therefore seems unreasonable to
impose upon the State the duty of showing not only that the
pleas were made with adequate counsel, but also that the pleas
were not involuntary.
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect
of the errors he alleges denied him a fair trial and that
reversal is required because of the cumulative effect even if
no single error was prejudicial. We need not consider this
argument because the only legitimate error raised- by defendant
was his conviction of both a greater and lesser included
offense. We reverse defendant's conviction for theft and
vacate the sentence thereon and affirm defendant's conviction
for aggravated robbery.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Associate
Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

•

No. 20557

